GREENLAND: THE ISLAND TRUMP WANTS TO CONTROL FOREVER

The President of the United States, Donald Trump, announced on Saturday, September 19, 2026, a “permanent agreement” with the authorities of Denmark and Greenland. It is in this context that Brian McDonald’s, a geopolitical and defense analyst, grants us this exclusive interview.

• As a reminder, Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he had reached an agreement with Denmark and Greenland granting the United States “permanent control” over the island’s security. To what extent does this statement represent a break with, or simply a continuation of, U.S. policy in the Arctic, given that Washington already had military prerogatives under the 1951 Defense Agreement?

It is both. The United States already had a military role in Greenland under a 1951 defense treaty with Denmark. That treaty was written into NATO and lasts as long as the NATO treaty does. The existing American base in northern Greenland comes from that agreement. So Washington is not starting from zero. What is new is the claim being made now. The new deal is presented as having no end date. President Trump also says the United States gets control over security and “all other needs,” and those needs are not defined. That is already wider than the 1951 treaty. The new agreement also adds a ban on bases for American adversaries and a United States veto on sensitive investments, so built on the 1951 treaty but expands the scope, hands the US extra powers like veto rights and it extends the duration.

• The Danish statement refers to strengthening security in the Arctic, while Trump speaks of “permanent control over security and all other needs.” Denmark insists on respect for its sovereignty and Greenland’s right to self-determination. In your view, what does this notion of “permanent control” actually mean? Does it involve a transfer of powers, or is it simply a reformulation of existing agreements?

“Permanent control” is political language/spin until the legal text is public. Denmark and Greenland still hold legal title to the island. But power , that is a different question. If the Greenlandic and Danish governments no longer get a say in approving a new American base, or can no longer limit American operations the way the host country normally can, then some decision-making has moved to Washington. Think of a European Union member: the country remains a sovereign state, but it hands certain policy powers to Brussels. The flag does not change hands. Some sovereign authority does. How far that goes in Greenland depends on the exact meaning of “control.” That will only be clear from the published agreement.

• Trump justified the agreement by citing the need to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the Arctic and to prevent any adversary from establishing a military base there. What are the United States’ real strategic and economic interests in Greenland today — including mineral resources, maritime routes, and radar surveillance — that could explain this insistence?

The United States has three practical interests, and they all sit inside a larger contest with Russia and China. The first is defense of North America.The US is working on a missile defense shield, the Golden Dome. For that missile shield Greenland is vital. The shortest path for long-range missiles toward the United States runs over the Arctic, and Greenland already hosts American radar used to watch that approach. The agreement offers the chance to place the required installations in Greenland for both observation and interceptioncombined with installations based on US soil. The second is a lasting American position in the Arctic as melting ice opens shipping routes for part of the year. The third is resources. Greenland has large undeveloped deposits of rare earths and other minerals used in electronics, batteries, and defense equipment. The immediate aim is influence over mining and infrastructure licenses, and keeping Russia and China out of those projects. That can reduce American reliance on China. That’s a different thing from mines actually opening next year.

• The announcement was made without a referendum or direct consultation of the Greenlandic population, even though polls show majority opposition to integration with the United States. Could this agreement create a disconnect between the political elites who signed it and the Greenlandic population, which is increasingly asserting its autonomy and, potentially, its independence?

It depends on what is actually in the deal. If the agreement leaves Greenlandic political identity intact and also brings economic activity, for example from a larger American military presence or other investment, it can even sit beside Greenland’s longstanding wish for more self-rule. Building local support is primarily the job of the governments in Greenland and Denmark. The more the text protects their authority and offers something visible to the local economy, the easier it is to explain to people there. The way this deal was reached did not help. Talk of buying the island or using force used up goodwill before there was even a document to defend.

• International law protects Denmark’s territorial integrity. Denmark and Greenland have stressed that the agreement “does not compromise the sovereignty” of the island. If the agreement does not formally transfer sovereignty, why does Trump speak of “permanent control” and “indefinite” arrangements? Is there a risk that such wording could be interpreted excessively and, in the long term, weaken Denmark’s legal position?

Trump speaks of permanent control because President Trump is describing power, and Denmark is describing legal titl over the lande. Those are not the same thing. A country can remain sovereign on paper and still hand over specific powers. If rights that now belong to Denmark or Greenland move to the United States, the host country no longer fully controls what happens on the island. That kind of wording can become dangerous later if Washington starts treating “permanent control” as the everyday reality. The protection is the written agreement, and then votes in the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments. Greenland and Denmark say they will sign during the United Nations General Assembly next week. After that the text should become public. That is when this question can be answered properly.

• Greenland is a Danish territory and, therefore, part of NATO. Does this agreement strengthen NATO’s collective security in the Arctic, or does it instead create a potentially dangerous precedent in which one member of the Alliance negotiates independently with an outside power on matters of common defense?

If the final text matches what officials are describing, the result can help NATO in the Arctic: no Russian or Chinese base, a larger American presence, and a filter on sensitive investment. The method did harm inside the alliance. Pressing a long-standing ally this hard created anger and broke a lot of trust among NATO allies. Repairing that will take serious time, if it can be repaired at all. We still need the full text before anyone should pretend the legal questions are settled.

• Russia and China also have interests in the Arctic. How might Moscow and Beijing perceive this agreement? Could it trigger an arms race in the Arctic, or could it instead contribute to regional stability by clarifying the respective spheres of influence?

Russia and China will see this as the United States drawing a harder line around the western Arctic. Moscow will call it militarization and use it to justify more of its own activity in the north. Beijing will see a closed door to minerals and infrastructure. This will not by itself trigger an arsm race as a contest in the Arctic was already happening. This agreement does not start that contest. It does make clear that Greenland is not an open door. Whether that leads to more stability depends on how the United States treats Denmark and Greenland after the signing, not on the first announcement.

• The agreement still has to be signed the following week on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and then ratified by the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments. How much room for maneuver do the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments have? Is rejection a realistic possibility, and what would be the political consequences of such a scenario?

They have room, the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments can still reject the agreement. But honestly they will be under heavy pressure to approve it, because walking away now would waste months of hard-won negotiation. In practice a no vote would likely cause a serious clash with the United States. That is why any fight may be about changing wording and adding guarantees, rather than killing the deal outright. Rejection remains possible, though the political cost could be high.

• Some Danish commentators argue that Copenhagen has “won” by preserving its interests while allowing Trump to claim a symbolic victory. Does this episode illustrate a new diplomatic method on Trump’s part, securing real concessions in exchange for symbolic gains, or does it instead reveal the limits of his transactional approach when dealing with allies who know how to maneuver diplomatically?

He got a real security result and a headline that sounds like victory. Denmark got to say that sovereignty survived. That can look like clever bargaining until you count the cost. I argued in January 2025 that the realistic outcome was a security arrangement and a veto over sensitive projects, not a sale of the island. That result did not require threatening a loyal ally in the proces. Partners who know how to negotiate can give him the symbolic win and still try to keep the legal core. To me that shows the limit of the method more than its brilliance. The security gains are real. The damage to trust was not necessary.

ENTRETIEN RÉALISÉ PAR MOHAMED LAMINE CISSÉ